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Panel II: Political Campaign Spending
Caps and the First Amendment:
Buckley v. Valeo Revisited
Moderator: Wayne Barrett*
Participants: Edward W. Hayes, Esq.**
Erik Joerss***
William G. Kastin, Esq.****
Leo Kayser, III, Esq.*****
Mark Lopez, Esq.******
MR. BARRETT: This panel addresses political campaign
spending and the First Amendment. We will examine Buckley v.
Valeo1 and discuss the impact of that case on congressional power
to limit campaign spending. The issue is at what point do campaign spending limits become limits on free speech.
I am Wayne Barrett. I am an investigative reporter and I cover
a lot of campaigns. Campaign finance stories have taken on a kind
of disappointing air in recent years because you cannot shock

* Investigative Journalist; Senior Editor, the Village Voice, New York, N.Y.
** Edward W. Hayes, P.C.; Governor's Committee to Review Audio-Visual Coverage of Court proceedings (1995); New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board
(1991-1993). University of Virginia, B.A. 1969; Columbia Law School, J.D. 1972.
*** Political Organizer/Project Coordinator, Common Cause, New York, N.Y.
University of Central Florida, B.A. 1994.
**** Court Attorney, New York Supreme Court, New York County, N.Y.; Staff
Attorney, New York City Campaign Finance Board (1995-1998). Boston University,
B.A., cum laude, 1990; New York Law School, J.D., cum laude, 1993.
***** Partner, Kayser & Redfern, L.L.P., New York, N.Y.; Committee on Drugs
and the Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Yale University, B.A.
1966; University of Virginia, LL.B. 1969.
****** Senior Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union. Campbell University, B.S. 1980; Rutgers University School of Law, J.D. 1985.
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

347

PANEL2.TYP

348

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 8:347

anymore.2 It has reached the stage where the quid pro quos of
campaign finance are so routine that they are hardly news, and
when they become news they seem to have little effect on the electorate.3
The Supreme Court case that we will analyze today considered
whether or not campaign contributions are protected speech.4 The
image that came to my mind was a contributor shouting “gimme”
at a crowded fund-raiser. But the Court did rule that expenditure
caps are a restriction on free speech.5
Here in New York City, we do have a campaign finance system
that does have an expenditure cap.6 It is a voluntary program, so
candidates choose whether or not to participate.7 We just had a
mayoral election in which all of the major candidates chose to participate in the program.8 It certainly did not seem to restrict anyone’s speech. In fact, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was able to say so
much that one New York Magazine ran an advertisement stating
that it was the only thing for which he had not claimed credit.9
So we are going to examine the question of expenditure caps as
a restriction on speech. We have four excellent panelists. Our first
speaker is Edward Hayes, a private attorney and former Assistant
District Attorney with the Bronx County District Attorney’s Office. He has been active in New York politics for much of his ca2. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Another Sham Exercise, 30 NAT’L J.
775 (1998).
3. See Helen Dewar, Petition Drive May Be Last Hope for Campaign Reform,
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1998, at A1. But see Bradley A. Smith, Real And Imagined Reform
Of Campaign Corruption: A Review Of Dirty Little Secrets: The Persistence Of Corruption In American Politics, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 141-142 (1996).
4. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-28.
5. See id. at 39.
6. New York City Campaign Finance Act (1988) (codified as NEW YORK CITY
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, §§ 3-701 to 3-715).
7. See id.
8. See William Murphy, City Briefing: A Report on People and Issues in City Government, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1997, at A37 (reporting allegations that both of New York
City’s major mayoral candidates used their political offices to sidestep spending limits
while participating in a Campaign Finance Board program that limited fund raising and
spending in return for matching funds); Adam Nagourney, Giuliani Leads His Opponents
In Money Raised and Spent, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1997, at B5.
9. See Felix H. Kent, Mayor Giuliani’s Right of Privacy, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 1998, at
3.
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reer and was appointed to the Civilian Complaint Review Board by
Mayor David Dinkins. I should also point out that he represents
many journalists, including Mike McAlary of the Daily News, so
he does have some interest in the First Amendment. After Mr.
Hayes, we will hear from Erik Joerss, a political organizer with
Common Cause. Mr. Joerss is actively lobbying for federal finance campaign reform. Following Mr. Joerss, we will hear from
Bill Kastin, an attorney with the New York City Campaign Finance Board. Mr. Kastin is a former motions law clerk for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Following
Mr. Kastin, we will hear from Leo Kayser, a partner in the law
firm of Kayser & Redfern. Mr. Kayser specializes in constitutional
law, literary property law, and commercial litigation, and was a
member of the transition team that helped New York Governor
George Pataki move into office after his election. The last speaker
we will hear from is Mark Lopez, a senior staff attorney with the
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) in New York. Prior to
joining the New York office of the ACLU, Mr. Lopez served as a
senior staff attorney with the ACLU’s National Prison Project. After each panelist speaks, we will have a roundtable discussion and
open the floor to questions.
Mr. Hayes is first.
MR. HAYES: I am a mouthpiece. Through out my career, my
job has been to stand next to somebody who obviously did something atrocious and argue that he did not. That role has made me
extremely well suited to discuss campaign finance reform. First,
almost since the beginning of time, people have tried to find a way
to manipulate people in authority. Campaign finance reform is essentially another way to control people’s natural impulse to corrupt
those in power.10 The second thing is, by and large, people that
give money to people who run for office want something in return.11
Now, let me discuss something that has raised very serious issues. Do you remember the news reports about the individual that

10. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28, 45 (1976).
11. See Jill Abramson, The Nation; Money Buys a Lot More Than Access, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at C4.
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apparently collected money from Chinese landscapers and Buddhist nuns, and gave the Clinton campaign very large sums of
money?12 There were reports of a man who visited the White
House on many occasions, an individual of Chinese descent who
raised money from a lot of overseas sources.13 It raises issues in
your mind that must be examined when considering campaign finance. The first thing I thought was that he went to the White
House to bring cash because people sometimes give cash to politicians instead of checks.14
The second reason why somebody might make a trip to a politician’s office is to check, for instance, if it would affect trade relations if three sixteen-year-old kids were shot in the middle of a
square in Beijing last night. And the politician might reply, you
could shoot one, you could shoot two, but three is too many.
That is a lot of what campaign finance is about. I am not saying that happened. What I am saying is that you want to avoid the
appearance of impropriety. You do not want anybody to worry
about improper behavior.
There are lots of ways to pay somebody to gain advantage. For
example, when Rupert Murdoch bought the New York Post he also
bought a disguised way of making campaign contributions. Every
time he can control an editorial page or what a story says, then in a
way, he is helping himself get a lucrative television license; he is
winning the love and affection of some United States Senators.15
Those in the audience who
School, by and large, when you
practice in New York City. New
land of wide judicial discretion.16

are students at Fordham Law
finish school you are going to
York City is the absolute heartThere are no judges in Manhat-

12. See Don Terry, Democratic Fund-Raiser Pleads Guilty to Fraud and Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A18.
13. See Amy Keller, Burton to Grill FEC for Going Soft on Gore Friend, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 26, 1998; Terry, supra note 12, at A18.
14. See Scott Turow, Reforming Campaign Finance, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 19,
1997, at F1.
15. See Frank Rich, Who’s Biased Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at A21; see
also Clifford J. Levy, Mayor Can’t Force Cable Firm to Add Channel, Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B21.
16. See Letter to the Editor from George Pataki, Governor, New York, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 18, 1996, at 2.
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tan17 or the Bronx18 who are not picked by the Democratic organization: none. There are no Republican judges elected to the New
York Supreme Court19 in Manhattan or the Bronx. The key to becoming a New York Supreme Court justice in Manhattan is your
relationship with Mr. Farell,20 the Democratic leader for Manhattan. All of these things relate to the life that you will lead when
you leave law school. The First Amendment issue concerns how
you live in a free society. Campaign finance is just one of the
checks and balances affected by that.
The essence of the Buckley decision was the idea of the judge
applying a balancing test. If you read Robert Bork’s book,21 he
will say judges should not have balancing tests. As much as possible, judges should not exercise their discretion; judges should give
only an interpretation of the existing law and not make policy.22
The reason is that, in an indirect way, campaign finance will affect
those decisions. If you can collect enough money and your candidate is elected, that will have an effect on which judges are appointed. Every study has shown that judges tend to reflect the
politics that they bring with them to the bench in their decisions.
So my first point is, when you think of campaign finance, first
think of what kind of life you will lead and where you will play on
the exercise of the power, which is what lawyers do. Lawyers are
basically brokers in the exercise of power. The opportunity to influence judges, politicians, and government is at the essence of
what we do as lawyers. That is the first issue.
The second issue is allowing the press to be the watchdogs of
campaign finance. People like Wayne Barrett, along with another
reporter named Andrea Bernstein, who writes for the New York

17. Manhattan—comprising the whole of New York County—is one of the five
boroughs of New York City. Each is a separate county.
18. The Borough of the Bronx comprises the whole of Bronx County, New York.
19. The New York Supreme Court is the state’s trial-level court of unlimited original jurisdiction. The state’s highest court is the New York Court of Appeals.
20. New York Assemblyman Herman D. Farell, Jr., chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee.
21. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
22. See id. at 143 (“It is a necessary implication of the prescribed procedures [set
out in Article V] that neither statute nor Constitution should be changed by judges.”).
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Observer,23 are two people that I probably would have to deny ever
meeting in my entire life. That is because I am relatively conservative and they have skewered virtually every politician with
whom I have had a good relationship over the last five years.24
Nonetheless, society would fall in about seven seconds if Wayne
Barrett and Andrea Bernstein could not write because, no matter
what reforms you introduce for campaign finance, the people who
are voting on those laws are living off that money. Politicians use
campaign finance to pay for their girlfriends, clothes, restaurant
bills, and the hotel rooms where they meet their girlfriends.
There are a million other ways that people get paid back for
making campaign contributions.25 You give them free legal ad23. Andrea Bernstein covers New York State politics for the New York Observer
and also writes for other popular publications, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. See Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The
Lord of the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw; The Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can
Evade, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3; Andrea Bernstein, Pataki’s Secrets, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at A21.
24. See, e.g., Wayne Barrett, Giuliani For Sale, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 7, 1998, at 25
(discussing New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani (“Mayor Giuliani”)); Wayne
Barrett, Fifty Reasons to Loathe Your Mayor, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 4, 1997 (same);
Wayne Barrett, State For Sale: How Pataki’s Secret Auction Attracted Conflict Contributions, VILLAGE VOICE, May 7, 1996, at 12 (discussing New York Governor George
Pataki); Wayne Barrett, Taking a Pass on Peace: The Rabin Rant of Rudy’s Rabbis,
VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 12, 1995 (discussing Mayor Giuliani); Wayne Barrett, Grand Old
Pals: The Political Rapsheet of Rudy’s Brooklyn Party Animal, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept.
26, 1995, at 13 (same); Wayne Barrett & Jon Bowles, A D.A. Gone Bad: How Albany
Ambitions Corrupted Joe Hynes, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 30, 1994 (discussing Joe Hynes);
Andrea Bernstein, Why Albany Can’t Shun Controversy, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4, 1998, at B5
(discussing New York State politicians working in Albany, New York’s capital); Andrea
Bernstein, A State Budget of Smoke and Mirrors, NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 1997, at G5
(same); Andrea Bernstein, A Cold, Cold Feeling Inside Albany, NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1997,
at G5 (same); Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The Lord of
the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw; The Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can Evade,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3 (same); Andrea Bernstein, Once Again, A State Budget
Mess, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1996, at A45 (same); Andrea Bernstein, Pataki’s Secrets, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at A21 (discussing New York Governor George Pataki).
25. See Council of Favors; Lords of Their Wards, Aldermen are Generous to a
Fault-With Taxpayer’s Money. The Gift-Giving Translates into Votes and Campaigns
Contributions, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997, at N1; George E. Jordan & Michael Powell, The
Buddy System is Rudy’s Too; Mayor’s Hiring Freeze Thawed to Accommodate Pals and
Kin, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18, 1994, at A6; Liam Pleven & Robert E. Kessler, Feds Probe Pataki’s 1994 Fundraising/Sources: Focus on Possible Promised Favors, NEWSDAY, Jan.
22, 1998, at A26; David E. Rosenbaum, In Political Money Game, the Year of Big
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vice. When some judge gets in trouble, you get appointed to investigate him and throw the investigation into the toilet. There are a
million ways to benefit from making campaign contributions.
So if you are asking me for my opinion about the most important issue regarding campaign finance reform, it is allowing the
views of Wayne Barrett on the left, the American Spectator on the
right, and the New York Times for noblesse oblige in the middle to
be heard.
The biggest problem that we have now, is the business with
soft money and hard money.26 Politicians find ways to collect
large sums of money for which they do not have to disclose the
source and there is not a campaign cap.27 The absolute champion
of that, God bless him, is Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-New
York).28 He collects very large sums of money and then transfers
it back to the local republican parties.29
Look at President Clinton. The Democratic Party in New York
is dying; it is hard to believe, but it is really in trouble.30 President
Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at A1; Bob Sablatura, The Other Government;
Contractual Friendships; Thin Line Separates Political Giving and Quid Pro Quo, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 24, 1998, at A1.
26. See 144 CONG. REC. H1726 (1998); see also Hearings on Campaign Finance
Revision: Soft Money Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 104th
Cong. 1 (1997) (testimony of Bradley A. Smith, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute; Anthony
Corrado, Giving, Spending and “Soft Money”, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 45 (1997).
27. See Art Buchwald, Hard Facts About Soft Money, WASH. POST, July 4, 1996, at
C1; James Dao, Pataki Will Not Open Books on Inaugural Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1995, at A1; Ernie Freda, On Washington; Disaster-Relief Bill Heading For Certain
Veto, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 6, 1997, at A8; Disclosure Best Reform of Soft-Money
Financing, SEATTLE TIMES, June 25, 1997, at B4; David E. Rosenbaum, In Political
Money Game, the Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at A1.
28. See Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The Lord of
the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw, The Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can Evade,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3; Howard Kurtz, Raging Al, WASH. POST, May 22,
1994, at W10.
29. See Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The Lord of
the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw, the Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can Evade,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3; Kurtz, supra note 28, at W10; Leslie Wayne, Republican Rainmaker—A Special Report; D’Amato Converted Donations to Help New York
Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at A1.
30. See Richard L. Berke, Democratic Party Unable to Pay Debts from Last Year’s
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A1; Richard L. Berke, Democrats’ Big Debt
Hurts Effort in Three Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A28; Tom Precious, State
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Clinton has taken all the money out of the state of New York.31
The Democratic Party of New York is screaming on the front page
of the New York Times that the Democratic National Party is collecting their share.32 Well, the reason for that is the Democrats are
not in power in New York State,33 so they no longer have access to
the goodies to give to contributors. A large Democratic contributor cannot go to the Governor and get a road contract or have advantageous judges appointed. So President Clinton comes in and
collects all of the money.
The difference between soft and hard money is wrong. It enables people who can accumulate a lot of money to make essentially surreptitious contributions.34 So the absolute essence of all
of this is disclosure. I think that if you are rich and you want to
give a lot of money to a politician, so long as everybody knows
about it, go ahead and do it. The election is still based on the majority of votes. Unions and other special interest groups in this
country will find a way to offset those large contributions of
money.
You cannot have secret contributions, and you also cannot have
disguised contributions. A disguised contribution would be where
some people in Indonesia decide to give money to advance the inDemocrats are Hard at Work Rebuilding Party, TIMES UNION, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1;
Adam Nagourney, New York State’s Democrats See Party Adrift and Divided, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1997, at A1; Adam Nagourney, Consensus Proves Elusive For Democratic
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at A51.
31. See Adam Nagourney, Democratic National Party to Share Wealth with States,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1998, at B4; Adam Nagourney, Fight Widens Over Keeping Party
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at B1.
32. See Adam Nagourney & James Dao, As Clinton Eats Up Contributions, New
York Party Says It’s Starving, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at A1; Adam Nagourney, Democratic National Party to Share Wealth with States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1998, at B4;
Adam Nagourney, Fight Widens Over Keeping Party Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998,
at B1.
33. See Precious, supra note 30, at A1; see also Robert J. McCarthy, State Democrats Meet to Discuss Plan on How to Regain Power in New York, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept.
30, 1997, at B6; Adam Nagourney, New York State’s Democrats See Party Adrift and
Divided, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at A2.
34. See Color of Money; End the Abuse; McCain-Feingold is Dead, and With It,
Hopes For Campaign-Finance Reform, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 3, 1998, at B8; Saundra
Smokes, End the Scam of Soft Money Campaign Contributions, SYRACUSE HERALD AM.,
Feb. 23, 1997, at G3.
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terests of people in China. I still do a lot of criminal defense work,
so I can tell you, if you represent any Chinese gangsters, they will
tell you that they can go home to China and nobody will be able to
get them. The Chinese gangsters, in some areas, run the banks, the
government, and the police.35 So, with a disguised contribution
you do not know whose interests are being served; that is why it is
a problem.
Those foreign contributors to President Clinton are on the run
and cannot be located36 because they are in China. They will not
turn up, and China will not give them back unless they want to. In
return for hiding out the main witnesses against President Clinton
in China, someone, somewhere paid a price. Actually, you paid
for that indirectly. I am not saying President Clinton is any different than the Republicans—there are lots of bad things you could
say about them too. But here, somebody made a power tradeoff.
In short, the essence of what I am saying is two things. First,
everything they tell you in law school about the law and the impartiality of the judiciary is lovely, but it is not true. As a lawyer, you
should look for things that go wrong, for partiality, and for unfair
influence.
Second, campaign contributions are a double-edged sword because contributions enable people to express their opinions and influence government—hopefully for the better, but possibly for the
worse.
The most important thing is disclosure. Interestingly enough,
in the practice of law, it is what people do not tell you which is the
most upsetting and often causes the most injustice.
MR. BARRET: Thank you very much. Our next panelist to
speak is Erik Joerss of Common Cause.
35. See Daniel Kwan, Warning as Crime Gangs Take Control, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 17, 1996; Jane H. Lii, Chinese Immigrant Flees an Asian Smuggling Gang a Second Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at B1; Sam Meddis, Chinese
Gangs: USA’s ‘New Mafia?’, USA TODAY, July 11, 1990, at A1.
36. See, e.g., Indictments Bolster Contentions of Foreign Influence Peddling,
OMAHA-WORLD HERALD, Feb. 21, 1998, at 34 (stating that Charlie Trie, who was indicted by a federal grand jury on fifteen counts of campaign finance violations in connection with the Clinton-Gore campaign, disappeared from the United States and was
thought to be hiding in China).
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MR. JOERSS: I would like to start by saying that what Mr.
Hayes just said about Andrea Bernstein is completely true. As a
matter of fact, Common Cause is honoring her on Friday for the
work she has done over the past year.37
It is really an honor to be here. Looking at the other panelists,
it is even more of an honor. I feel a bit overwhelmed.
I want to talk a little bit about Buckley v. Valeo,38 in that the
key to Buckley, according to the justices, was that you can limit
contributions only if Congress can show a compelling interest,
such as corruption or the appearance of corruption.39 In Buckley,
the Court decided that Congress could limit contributions in order
to eliminate corruption.40 The Court held, however, that Congress
could not limit spending, because the Court did not see the same
link between spending and corruption.41
We see now, twenty-two years later, that the system has created a hybrid42 where it has ignored basic supply-and-demand
rules. Although the decision has lead to an unquenchable thirst for
campaign dollars because campaign spending is not restricted,
there are limited ways to raise this money.43 This has fostered
much of the illegality and the underground contributions that we
presently see.44
If the Court looked at Buckley now, twenty-two years later, it
would see that the current system is unworkable, partly because we
37. See Judge Sets Sights on Old Seat, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 19, 1998,
at B2.
38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
39. Id. at 26-29, 58.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 45-47, 53.
42. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1997).
43. See generally, No More Loophole to Avoid Special Counsel, TAMPA TRIB., Sept.
7, 1997, at 2 (discussing restrictions on raising “hard money” contributions).
44. See William Booth, California Rep. Kim, Wife Charged in Campaign Donation
Scheme, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A16; Art Buchwald, Hard Facts About Soft
Money, WASH. POST, July 4, 1996, at C1; James Dao, Pataki Will Not Open Books on
Inaugural Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A1; Firm Faces Charges of Illegal Donations, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), May 16, 1997, at E1; Freda, supra note 27; Jerry Seper, Lobbyist Gets Fine, Probation in Illegal Espy-Case Donation, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1998, at A2.
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do need spending caps in order to limit the role that money plays in
our political system.
The Buckley Court equated money with free speech.45 It
pointed out that advertising is the key instrument used by candidates to get their messages out.46 The Court ignored such things as
debates, candidate forums, and panel discussions.47 All of which
are generally more substantive than a thirty-second sound bite in a
television advertisement that attacks competitors and does not advance any views.
So we are left with a system where money, as Mr. Hayes just
said, is the measure of a candidacy and how seriously a candidate
is taken. Right now, the race that we will see with Alfonse
D’Amato against Geraldine Ferraro48 or Mark Green49 or Charles
Schumer50 is expected to cost somewhere around $40 to $45 million.51 Senator D’Amato is expected to spend well over $20 million;52 he already has well over $12 million in his campaign
chest.53 There is talk that Geraldine Ferraro might not be the right

45. In Buckley, the Court stated that:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure
of money.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
46. See id. at 26.
47. See id. Although the Court ignored debates, forums, and panel discussions, it
did recognize speeches and rallies as expensive approaches for political candidates to
convey their messages. See id.
48. Former U.S. Representative (D-New York); 1984 Democratic vice presidential
candidate.
49. Public Advocate for the City of New York.
50. U.S. Representative (D-New York)
51. See Marie Cocco, Get It While It’s Hot—the $50-Million Senate Seat,
NEWSDAY, July 17, 1997, at A49; Joel Siegel, Campaigns Adopt Art of the Dial, DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 15, 1998, at 51; James Toedtman, First Bucks, Then Ballots, NEWSDAY, Jan.
11, 1998, at A24.
52. See Robert Gavin, D’Amato Polishing Image For Election, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Mar. 24, 1998, at A4 (estimating cost of New York campaign to exceed
$30 million).
53. Compare Marc Humbert, D’Amato Keeps Lead in Raising Donations, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 31, 1998, at B2 (estimating that D’Amato has raised $12.2
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person to run against him simply because she has not raised
enough money yet and she may not have the ability to do so.54
Mark Green, who has arguably a very, very strong record, has only
raised $1 million.55 Now, although $1 million may seem like a lot
of money, in state politics it is a pittance. It is enough to ensure
that Mark Green will probably be the first one out of the race.
Charles Schumer, who has raised $8 to $9 million at this point, is
most likely to be a successful candidate—and it is not based on his
record; it is based on the fact that he was able to raise this money.56
So we have candidates whose expertise is not necessarily on issues. We have candidates whose expertise is not necessarily in
representing the people. Fund-raising prowess is the major skill
that a candidate needs right now to run for office.57 I do not think
it is terribly difficult to see how destructive that is.
In the last election cycle, it was estimated that the average Senate seat went for $4.5 million.58 So, from their first week in office
until they are out, Senators have to raise $15,000 every single
week. This also takes away from the job that politicians are supposed to do for the public.
I got involved with this issue working on Project Independence
with Common Cause. Project Independence started largely because two former Senators, Bill Bradley59 and Alan Simpson,60
both walked away from the Senate citing the fact that fund-raising
has obscured the reason why they actually wanted to serve the pub-

million), with Toedtman, supra note 51, at A24 (estimating that D’Amato raised $12.7
million and has already spent $4.2 million).
54. See Clifford J. Levy, Ferraro Says Fund-Raising Shows Her Strength, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at B5.
55. See Humbert, supra note 53, at B2.
56. See Gavin, supra note 52, at A4.
57. See Toedtman, supra note 51, at A24; Can Ferraro Raise Enough To Win Democratic Nomination, Run Against D’Amato?, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Jan. 29, 1998,
available in West, WESTLAW, 1998 WL 5620770.
58. See Toedtman, supra note 51, at A24; see also David S. Broder, Campaigns
Without Shame, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at A21.
59. See Clifford J. Levy, Bradley Says He Won’t Seek 4th Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1995, at A1.
60. See Joel Achenbach, Hi Ho, Simpson, Away! Roasts and Toasts for the Cowboy
Senator, WASH. POST, May 22, 1996, at C1.
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lic.61 So they started Project Independence.62
Part of it was based on a poll in the New York Times, stating
that nine out of ten people polled said that the campaign finance
system is broken and in desperate need of repair—two out of ten
thought that legislators might actually act on it.63 So again, because of our campaign fund raising system, our candidates are not
as strong, we have low voter turnouts,64 and people feel less connected with the system.65
In Project Independence, which was largely a petition drive,
there were 1 million signatures gathered around the country—
100,000 in New York State.66 A carload of them was dumped at
Senator D’Amato’s office. His campaign staff said they had never,
ever gotten that many calls or letters on an issue before. Yet he ignored it. He is basically still against the McCain-Feingold bill.
The question is, if his constituents are clearly for it, what is his
motivation for going against it? He already has his war chest. One
could argue the motivation for going against it is that the party
leadership, due to things like soft money and the way that the national parties are able to raise unlimited money, has a disproportionate amount of power. If Sen. D’Amato decides to buck people
like Senator McConnell67 or Senator Lott,68 he can be punished in
the next election cycle. A lot of the Republican soft money maybe
will go to him, as it certainly will not go to people like John

61. See Richard L. Berke, Bradley, in Retirement, Remains Coy on Presidency,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at A24.
62. See Jonathan Riskind, Campaign Gift Reform Backed at Gathering, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, June 5, 1997, at A7; Former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson Elected To The
Board Of Directors Of U.S. Energy Corp., PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 17, 1997.
63. See Michael Lewis, A Question of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at F32
(stating that the poll showed that “while 90% of the electorate say that money is corrupting politics, only 23% expect Congress to do anything about it”).
64. See Darrel Rowland, Advocate of Campaign Reform Raises Big Bucks,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 12, 1997, at D2.
65. See Jonathan Riskind, High-Dollar Campaigning, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 9,
1997, at D4.
66. See Edwin Chen, A Hard March Through Campaign-Cash Jungle, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1997, at A14 (stating that one million signatures were obtained).
67. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky).
68. Senator Trent Lott (R-Mississippi).
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McCain69 or Olympia Snowe,70 who right now support the
McCain-Feingold bill.71
Every presidential election cycle we hear that we are getting
the lesser of two evils.72 It is not an empty refrain. We are not the
ones who really decide who is among the available choices for
election. This again relates to the fact that getting elected is about
money, rather than skill and caring about issues.
This is partly why we are here talking about Buckley. In Buckley, the Court acknowledged that there were fundamental problems
with our campaign finance system.73 The Court, however, created
this hybrid which actually exacerbated the problems. I think the
decision would be different if they looked at Buckley now. If the
Court did the fact finding today, they would find many corruptive
influences. For example, Amway, which is a direct marketing
group, gave $1 million cash to the Republican Party in April of last
year.74 In July of last year, a federal tax bill went through in which
Amway received a $270 million tax break.75 This is, in my opinion, the straight quid pro quo corruption that Congress and the
Court sought to prevent.76 Yet, we see more and more illustrations
of corruption—this is why reform is so necessary.

69. Senator John McCain (R-Arizona).
70. Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine).
71. See Lewis, supra note 63, at F32.
72. See Campaign Notebook: Clinton Aides Begin Work Early on Second-Term
Staff, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 6, 1996, at A12; David Goldberg, Skeptical Georgians Opt
for Status Quo, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1996, at B7; How our Panelists Voted in
Presidential Election, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1996, at A13.
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (finding that the problem of campaign
finance is not illusory).
74. See Ruth Marcus, Common Cause Lists “Soft” Donors, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,
1998, at A23; John R. Wilke, Big GOP Donor Gets His Way in Bill Affecting Merger of
Michigan Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at A16; see also Greg Hitt, Favored
Companies Get 11th-Hour Breaks, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997, at A2.
75. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (Aug. 5,
1997) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West, WESTLAW through Pub.L.
No. 105-165)); see also Clinton Prepares to Fire a Popgun at Giveaways, USA TODAY,
Aug. 11, 1997, at A11; Michelle Malkin, We Have Ourselves to Blame for Beggars in 3Piece Suits, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at B4.
76. See Federal Election Campaign Finance Reform: Hearings on Campaign Finance before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 105th Cong. (1997); see also
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
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MR. BARRET: Thank you Mr. Joerss. Our next presentation
is from William Kastin, an attorney with the New York City Campaign Finance Board.
MR. KASTIN: Thank you.
I want to start today by reading a quote of Charles Keating, the
former operator of the failed Lincoln Savings & Loan.77 During
the time period in which the Lincoln Savings & Loan was being
investigated, Charles Keating raised more than $1.3 million for
five United States Senators and their causes.78 This is what he had
to say:
“One question had to do with whether my financial support in
any way influenced several political figures to take up my cause. I
want to say, in the most forceful way I can, I certainly hope so.”79
Although this quote deals with campaign contributions and this
panel is discussing spending limits, I think the quote is significant
because it illustrates an important point in today’s political arena:
money talks.
As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckley that
government-mandated expenditure limits violate the First Amendment,80 wealthy citizens like Charles Keating are able to inject
large amounts of money into political campaigns and causes. Incumbents and challengers alike welcome such money, as there is
no limit whatsoever on the amount of money politicians can spend.
The Buckley Court’s holding does not completely prohibit
spending limits.81 There is a footnote in the decision, footnote 65,
which states that “Congress may engage in public financing of
election campaigns and may condition the acceptance of public
funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified ex77. See Lincoln S & L Lacks Sufficient Capital, Bank Board Says, WALL ST. J., Dec.
23, 1988, § 1, at 7..
78. See Jill Abramson & Paul Duke, Jr., The Keating Five: Senators Who Helped
Lincoln S&L Now Face Threat to Their Careers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1989, at A1;
Gramm’s Campaign Manager Counts GOP Support in Lake, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct.
31, 1995, at 4.
79. David J. Jefferson, Keating of American Continental Corp. Comes Out Fighting,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1989, § 2, at 2.
80. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.
81. See id. at 57 n.65.
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penditure limits.”82 In other words, if a candidate chooses to accept public funds, the government may establish a spending limit
upon that candidate without violating the First Amendment.83
New York City has one such program. The Campaign Finance
Board (“Board”) administers the Campaign Finance Program
(“program”), which was established in 1988 following a series of
scandals in New York City government.84 Those scandals focused
public attention on the issue of influence over elected officials and
whether such influence leads officials to act for private gain rather
than for the public welfare.85
The purpose of the Campaign Finance Act86 is to decrease the
influence of private campaign contributions on candidates for New
York City office.87 The Campaign Finance Act seeks to promote
community-level fund-raising, enable serious candidates to run effective campaigns regardless of access to money, increase public
understanding of local issues, and increase participation in local
elections.
The program is voluntary and is available to candidates who
are running for the offices of mayor, public advocate, comptroller,
borough president, or city council.88 Candidates who join the program—called participating candidates—must abide by contribution
and expenditure limits and provide disclosure of campaign activ82. Id.
83. See id.
84. New York City Campaign Finance Act, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch.
7, §§ 3-701 to 3-715. See generally Jeffrey D. Friedlander, et al., The New York City
Campaign Finance Act, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 345 (1988) (describing New York City’s
campaign finance system); Is This the Best We Can Do? Regarding Tomorrow’s City
Council Vote on an Historic Campaign Finance Reform, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1988, at 48
(discussing New York City’s campaign finance system).
85. See Nicole A. Gordon, Campaign Finance Reform: Life in the Trenches; The
New York City Model: Essentials for Effective Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 J.L.
POL’Y 79 (1997) (citing political scandals in New York City during the 1980s as the impetus for various reforms including the Campaign Finance Act) [hereinafter Gordon I];
Michael C. Miller & Maranda E. Fritz, New York City’s Campaign Finance Laws, N.Y.
L.J., June 17, 1993, at 1.
86. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, §§ 3-701 to 3-715.
87. See Nicole A. Gordon & Hyla P. Wagner, The New York City Campaign Finance Program: A Reform that is Working, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605, 607-08 (1992).
88. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE, tit. 3, ch. 7 § 3-703 (outlining eligibility and
other requirements).
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ity.89
Participating candidates running for city-wide office must also
participate in a series of debates.90 In return, candidates who demonstrate sufficient public support and are opposed on the ballot can
receive public matching funds.91 In addition, the Board monitors
candidates’ compliance with the program92 and publishes the Voter
Guide93 before each election, which gives the candidates an opportunity to present their views to the public.94
The program’s expenditure limits are intended to curtail excessive campaign spending and enhance public confidence in elected
officials. History indicates that, in certain instances, the public
disapproves of candidates who fail to join the program. For example, in the 1989 mayoral election, candidate Ronald Lauder, who
chose not to participate in the program, spent $13 million on his
failed 1989 mayoral bid,95 but five major mayoral candidates who
did join the program agreed to spend no more than $3.6 million.96
Realistic spending limits reduce the public perception that elective offices are for sale and create a more level financial playing
field on which all candidates, including challengers, can compete
more meaningfully.97
The program does recognize, however, that the spending limit
could handicap a participant if the participant is facing a candidate
who has not joined the program. In those situations, the program
89. See id. § 3-703(d), (f), (h).
90. See id. § 3-709.5(1).
91. See id. § 3-705(2) (discussing public financing).
92. See id. § 3-710 (Board’s auditing powers).
93. The Voter Guide, published by New York City’s Campaign Finance Board,
helps inform voters about candidate positions. See generally Laurence Laufer, Campaign
Finance: New York’s Campaign Finance Program for the 1997 City Elections: A Look
Ahead, 2 CITY LAW 101 (1996). The guide is published in five languages and distributed
to all registered voters. See id.
94. The Voter Guide provides each candidate with one page to present his or her
views and qualifications. See id.
95. See Michael Weber, Primary ‘89 Now, The Real Fund Raising Stars, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 13, 1989, at 36; see also Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 607-08.
96. See Weber, supra note 95, at 36; see also Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at
611.
97. See Gordon I, supra, note 85, at 83-84; George N. Spitz, New York Forum
About Politics—Reform Money Still Talks, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 1990, at 62.
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spending limit is removed when the non-participating candidate
has raised or spent more than one half the expenditure limit,98 of
$30,000 in the case of the city council.
In addition, the Board realizes that during a political campaign
there may be expenditures made on behalf of a candidate by an individual entity not connected with the campaign.99 In those situations, the expenditures, which are referred to as independent expenditures, are not subject to the spending limit, as long as the
participant did not in fact authorize, request, or cooperate with the
expenditures in any way.100
Based on the ten years of the program and the three election
cycles in which the Board has administered the program, there are
nine observations I would like to make about spending limits and
the First Amendment. Naturally, the numbers that I reference will
continue to change as candidates continue to file.
First, despite First Amendment concerns, history indicates that
a majority of candidates choose to join the voluntary program and
are willing to abide by spending limits.101 For example, in the
1997 primary election, 81% of the candidates on the ballot chose to
join the program. In the general election, 55% of the candidates on
the ballot joined the program. In 1997, 71% of all incumbents
joined the program.102 Those numbers are even higher when looking at candidates who are considered competitive candidates. Consider also the 1996 Senate race in Massachusetts, where Republican Governor William Weld and Democratic Senator John Kerry
agreed to limit their expenditures to $6.9 million.103
What those numbers indicate is that, while not every candidate
chooses to agree to abide by spending limits, the claim that a candidate’s freedom of speech is actually impeded by the imposition

98. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, § 3-706(3).
99. See id. § 3-702(8) (defining the term “contribution”).
100. See id.; Miller & Fritz, supra note 85, at 1 n.18-20.
101. See Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 623-25.
102. Program participation rates and participants’ campaign finance data are available at the offices of the campaign finance board.
103. See Frank Phillips, Deal to Limit Spending Breaks Down, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
24, 1996, at A1. But see Max Frankel, Words & Image: Target the Tube, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1996, § 6, at 42 (stating that, ultimately, even they went over the limit).
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of spending limits may be mere speculation. Rather, candidates
are willing to abide by spending limits in competitive political
races without experiencing a threat to their freedom of speech.104
The second point is that spending limits must be set at an
amount high enough for all candidates running for a particular office to maintain effective campaigns.105 For example, spending
limits set for the city council elections must account for the highest-spending race in all city council districts. After each election,
the spending limits must be fine-tuned to reflect the most recent
spending patterns.106
One point to keep in mind is that, because reform is an ongoing
process, it is important for the spending limits to be re-examined
after each election to make sure that candidates are subject to a fair
limit that will not violate their rights.107
Third, there is ample evidence that a public financing system
with spending limits, as referred to in the footnote in Buckley,108
does work. An analysis of spending by candidates who participated in the program in 1997 clearly indicates that few candidates
approached the spending limit for their particular offices. For example, the spending limit in 1997 for a New York City borough
president candidate was $2.3 million. Twelve borough president
candidates participated in the program. Only two candidates out of
the twelve spent more than $1 million, and no candidate spent
more than approximately $1.8 million.
Similar results were found in the city council elections, in
which 138 candidates participated in the program and the spending
limit was $288,000. Of the 138 candidates, only a few candidates
104. See generally Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundraising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994) (analyzing campaign spending limits in light of the First
Amendment).
105. See Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 618-21.
106. In New York City, the spending limits are adjusted each election cycle to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN CODE § 3706(1)(e).
107. See Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 617; Nicole A. Gordon, The New
York City Model: Essentials for Effective Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 J.L. & POL’Y
79, 89 (1997).
108. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976).
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spent more than $200,000 and no candidate came within $10,000
of the combined spending limit. One notable candidate who did
approach the spending limit in the 1997 elections was New York
City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani.109
The Campaign Finance Board has never received a complaint
from a participating candidate that he or she was unable to run an
effective campaign due to the amount of the spending limit. The
claim that the program spending limits have the effect of hampering a candidate’s ability to communicate his or her ideas is simply
without merit.
Fourth, some commentators have claimed that spending limits
hinder a challenger from mounting an effective campaign against
an incumbent.110 But the last three city elections for mayor do not
support this proposition, as a challenger defeated the incumbent in
two of the last three elections.111 Moreover, there is no evidence
that the sole exception—the 1997 election—was due to the spending limit hindering the challenger. Rather, it was more likely the
result of the general competitiveness between the two major candidates.112
Fifth, numerous candidates have indicated that spending limits
actually enhance speech, as they prohibit wealthy candidates from

109. See Robert Polner, Mayor Admits Illegal Donations, NEWSDAY, Sept. 13, 1997,
at A3 (reporting that the Giuliani campaign had raised $8.6 million by mid-September
1997); cf. Clifford J. Levy, Rules Stiffened for Spending on Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 1997, at B1 (reporting that 27 donors who had contributed the maximum allowable to
the Giuliani campaign were able to funnel more funds into the Giuliani campaign through
“soft money” contributions to the New York state Republican Party).
110. See, e.g., FRANK SORAUF, JR., MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 179 (1988)
(concluding that caps harm rather than enhance competition); Joel M. Gora, Campaign
Finance Reform: Still Searching for a Better Way, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 151 (1997) (stating that severe limits make it harder for challengers to raise money and that the disparity
is greater because incumbents have free means of communications).
111. See William Bunch, et al., Election ‘93 a Rudy Makeover, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4,
1993 (reporting Giuliani’s victory over Dinkins in the 1993 mayoral race); Rick Hampson, Now Comes the Hard Part for New York’s New Mayor, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4,
1993, available in West, WESTLAW 1993 WL 5597131; Frank Lynn, The New York
Primary: Dinkins Sweeps Past Koch for Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1989 at A1.
112. Cf. CNN Special Event: Elections (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 4, 1997)
(discussing the two major candidates).
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drowning out candidates with less financial resources.113 Thus,
spending limits can provide more candidates with an opportunity
to participate in competitive races, thereby widening the field of
participants to those who otherwise could not viably run due to a
lack of resources.
Sixth, a spending cap also influences contributions.114 If a candidate is limited in the amount of money he or she can spend, the
candidate will not need to amass contributions from as large a pool
of donors. Therefore, by imposing reasonable spending limits, the
amount of contributions a candidate collects, and the prospect of
undue influence and corruption as a result thereof, are minimized.
Seventh, one should also consider the role government can play
in expanding political speech.115 New York City, for example, recently adopted a local law providing that, candidates running for
citywide office who join the program and appear on the ballot must
participate in a series of debates.116 Thus, in addition to receiving
the benefit of public funds, candidates have an opportunity to appear before the voters and present their opinions at no cost to their
campaigns.
Similarly, the Voter Guide,117 which is published by the Board
before each election, gives candidates the opportunity to present
their views to the public.118 Those are examples of campaign fi-

113. Cf. Tim Curran, Campaign Reform Becomes Hottest Game on Hill; Boren
Moves to Restrict Lobbying, ROLL CALL, Jan. 25, 1993 (discussing Senator Ernest Hollings statements about campaign spending).
114. See Gora, supra note 110, at 162. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1976) (rejecting the argument that spending caps are necessary because they prevent
contributors from sidestepping the contribution limits by paying directly for advertisements or other campaign activities); cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm’n, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1958) (stating that “elected officials
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial
gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns”).
115. See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws:
Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 59 (1987) (discussing
the government’s role in regulating campaign finance and the effects on speech).
116. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, § 3-709.5. The program is voluntary in that candidates who elect not to join forgo public money.
117. See supra, notes 93-94 (describing the Voter Guide)..
118. See supra notes 93-94 (explaining how candidates use the Voter Guide to pre-
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nance reform in which action by the government augments speech
rather than hampers it.
Eighth, the program’s history indicates that a large percentage
of campaigns in New York City are driven by the cost of media
and mailings.119 In 1997, for example, seven of the top ten vendors used by participants were related to political mailings or the
media.120 In 1993, approximately forty percent of all expenditures,
or $14.2 million, was spent on advertising and campaign mailings.121 By providing free television time for candidates or subsidizing mailings, the overall cost of campaigns could be diminished
and spending limits would not have the same negative connotation
they may have to some candidates.122
Lastly, at the federal level, spending on political campaigns has
reached monumental heights.123 In fact, the New York Times recently estimated that it takes at least $5 million to run a successful
Senate campaign, and in some states as much as $30 million, and
that a House seat can cost $2 million.124
One needs to question the quality of candidates running for a
political office when only those with immense fortunes or access
thereto are able to run effective campaigns. Look at the recent ex-

sent their views to the public).
119. See Philip Lentz, Robust Spending in ‘97 Elections Bolsters Vendors: Consultants, Hotels Among Big Winners as NYC Politicians Pay Out $36 Million, CRAIN’S
N.Y. BUS., Mar. 16, 1998.
120. See generally id. (discussing budget allocations).
121. See 1 NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, ON THE ROAD TO REFORM:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS 40 (1994) [hereinafter ROAD
TO REFORM] (reporting that “[c]itywide candidates put more money into advertising than
anything else, and the biggest chunk of advertising dollars was spent on television”).
122. Cf. Janet E. Williams & Suzanne McBride, Funding From Special Interest
Group Pays for a Lot More Than Just Getting Elected, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 10,
1997, at A1 (quoting Representative David Frizzel); see also McCain-Feingold Bill, S.
25, 105th Cong. (1997).
123. See Allison Mitchell, Senate Resumes Debate on Campaign Financing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at A17; see also Lawrence M. O’Rourke, Impact of “Soft Money”
Brings Call for Reform, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 26, 1997, at A1; Michael Posner, Congressional Campaign Spending Smashes Record, REUTERS NA WIRE, Dec. 21, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ACRNWS File.
124. See Max Frankel, Word & Image: TV Remedy for a TV Malady, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1996, at 36.
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amples of Ross Perot,125 Steve Forbes,126 and, in California, Michael Huffington.127 In 1994, Huffington spent $28 million of his
own money in a narrow loss to Senator Diane Feinstein.128 In the
1996 presidential primary race, Steve Forbes spent $4 million in
Arizona alone, approximately four times as much as Senator Bob
Dole, and prevailed.129
This pattern of high spending has emerged on the local level as
well.130 In the 1993 race for City Council in Council District 4 on
the Upper East Side of Manhattan, the incumbent Andrew Eristoff
did not participate in the program, but he spent almost $624,000 in
the general election, or about $26.54 per vote received. His opponent spent $228,000, or about $9.77 per vote.131 In 1997, Andrew
Eristoff ran a similar campaign.
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”132 Those words do not
mean that any restriction on speech is unconstitutional, as such an
interpretation would prevent laws against fraud and blackmail.133
Admittedly, expenditure caps limit the quantity of political speech,
as when a wealthy politician is prevented from broadcasting as
125. See, e.g., David Lauter, Perot Spent Nearly $400,000 in March Funding: Most
of it Was His Own Money, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at 12; see also David Morgan,
Gingrich Calls Wealthy Campaigners America’s No. 1 Problem, REUTERS NA WIRE, Jan.
27, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
126. See id.; see also David C. Johnston, Mr. Forbes’s Modest Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1996, at D5.
127. See Todd S. Purdum, California Governor’s Race: A New Height in Spending,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at A1; see also Posner, supra note 123.
128. See Purdum, supra note 127, at A1; Posner, supra note 123.
129. See B. Drummond Ayres, Arizona; Rare Chance in a Contest Too Close to
Predict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at A18; Jodi Enda & Steven Thomma, Forbes Wins
in Arizona; Dole Takes Dakotas; GOP Race Thrown Into Further Turmoil; Doubts
Mounting About Senate Leader’s Viability, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 28, 1996, at
A1.
130. Cf. Ken Fireman, Long Island Politics High Prices: Campaign Spending on
the Rise, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1996, at A1 (discussing the rise in campaign spending for
local positions on Long Island); see Sam H. Verhovek, Perot as a Political Presence:
1992 All Over Again?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at A10.
131. See ROAD TO REFORM, supra note 121, at 87; Newest Council Member Unsure
If He Will Recoup $250,000 Campaign Loan, UPI, Mar. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ACRNWS File.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
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many advertisements as he or she would like, the sum total of advertisements is less.
But what is the result? Have democracies that reasonably restrict electoral expenses suffered from a lack of knowledge about
candidates and issues? Do we want a system where qualified candidates are prevented from seeking office because they lack the resources and access to immense amounts of money? Instituting
spending limits levels the playing field and provide more candidates with the possibility of waging a competitive campaign.
The Buckley decision held that imposing mandatory spending
limits on a candidate impinges on free speech.134 Regrettably, the
real speech issue today as a result of the Buckley decision is that
money talks.
MR. BARRET: Thank you Mr. Kastin. Mr. Kayser is next.
He is a partner in the New York City law firm of Kayser & Redfern
MR. KAYSER: Thank you. I would like to thank the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for
giving me a chance to speak today.
I have practiced law here in New York City for about twentyseven years. I had been politically dormant for about thirty years,
until a friend of mine, George Pataki, thought he might have an
opportunity to beat and unseat an incumbent governor: Mario Cuomo.
I have known George Pataki since he was about eighteen years
old. I spoke to him and thought that maybe he should make a race
for the governorship. As no one knew who he was at the time, I
offered to help him raise some money—he didn’t have any—to
make it possible for him to make the race. Later, the party leadership gave him support;135 then he won the party nomination136 and

134. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976).
135. See James Dao, The 1994 Campaign: Pataki In a Fury of Campaigning, Candidates Pursue Last Minute Votes; Pataki and his Party, From L.I. to Albany, Show a
United Front, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at A49.
136. See David Bauder, Pataki Wins Conservatives’ Backing Gubernatorial Primary is Set, RECORD (N.J.), June 5, 1994, at A6; James Dao, Conservatives Choose Pataki for Governor, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1994, at A42.
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later was elected. So I have been active for the last three years
helping him raise money and I have seen the system from that perspective.
I am also a constitutional lawyer who has been involved in
First Amendment issues. I was involved in the ACLU’s opposition
to the government petition for Supreme Court review in United
States v. Progressive, Inc.,137 in which the government tried to restrict the publication of instructions for making a hydrogen bomb:
even though that information was already in the public sphere.
I also have written in the area of campaign finance. I think
there needs to be reform in the current law, just like the Common
Cause speaker Erik Joerss believes. Common Cause has examined
this issue for a long time. A number of years ago, a fellow named
Fred Wertheimer, proposed the statute that the Buckley v. Valeo
reviewed.138
In that case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
First Amendment and found that there is a direct correlation between money and access to speech.139 Now, is there anyone who
thinks that the government can restrict the number of pamphlets
you can print and circulate in an election, which would be a direct
restriction on printing and distribution for political purposes? Can
the government restrict how many advertisements you can buy in
the free market on the radio or television? Can the government restrict any other way of reaching people? Doesn’t the First
Amendment protect us against that? The United States Supreme
Court found that there is a direct correlation between money and

137. 467 F. Supp. 990, dismissed as moot, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The federal government voluntarily withdrew its petition for certiorari prior to consideration by
the Supreme Court.
138. See Dierde Shesgreen, Campaign Finance Reform Movement Gathers Momentum, TEXAS LAW., Nov. 3, 1997, at 4; Edwin M. Yoder, Reform an Oxymoron to Campaign Cash, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 9, 1996, at 34. Fred Wertheimer is head of Democracy 21 and is President of Common Cause. He has given testimony on honoraria
and salary levels for top-level government officials before Congressional committees.
See Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451,
487.
139. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 26, & 266 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that “[o]ne of the points on which all Members of the Court agree is
that money is essential for effective communication in a political campaign”).
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the ability to reach people.140 In fact, there is a consensus there.141
To try to overrule that proposition, to argue that way—and I
have heard a couple of people argue that way—is the same as trying to overrule Roe v. Wade142 on abortion. The debate is over. It
is settled law that the government has to stay out of certain areas of
decisions with respect to reproductive issues,143 and the government cannot prevent parties or individuals from spending as much
money as they can raise or choose to spend in legitimate purposes
for propagating ideas.144 That will not change. So anyone who is
advocating legislation which is premised upon the law changing in
that area is whistling Dixie in New York City.
Now, also there is a relationship between money and success.
Ron Lauder was mentioned earlier, he was on the Conservative
Party line and ran for mayor spending $13 million or some large
amount.145 Did Ron Lauder expect to be elected mayor on the
Conservative Party line in New York City? I think he got about
two percent of the vote or something like that;146 it was a small
vote. The answer is no.
During that race he discussed term limits for city government,

140. See id.
141. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 266, with Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1319
n.6 (1st Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with the Court in Buckley, but admitting that “virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of
money”). See also Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The
Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1357 (1994).
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. See generally Robert A. Sedlerfn, The Constitution and Personal Autonomy:
The Lawyering Perspective, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 773, 787 (1994) (stating that the
Court’s decisions “make[] it clear, as the Court affirmed in Roe v. Wade, that reproductive freedom is a fundamental right, so that any interference with reproductive freedom
must be tested under the exacting compelling governmental interest standard of review”);
Loye M. Barton, The Policy Against Federal Funding for Abortions Extends Into the
Realm of Free Speech After Rust v. Sullivan, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 637 (1992) (noting that
abortion is a settled issue).
144. See Gora, supra note 110, at 140-68 (arguing against government intervention
in campaign finance).
145. Ron Lauder ultimately spent $14.2 million. See Frank Lynn, Giuliani Reports
$200,000 Loan From the GOP, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1989, § 1, at 27.
146. See Sam Roberts, Dinkins Defeats Giuliani in a Close Race; Wilder Seems
Virginia Winner, Florio In; Voters, 5-4, Approve New York Charter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1989, at A1.
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city council, and the mayor.147 Everybody else running for mayor
had no interest in discussing term limits. But he was propagating
an idea. Well, it went to a referendum in the City of New York
twice so far, and it has won twice, and Ron Lauder is the man responsible for that based on the money he spent to get out that idea.
The political establishment in New York City hates it, but that is
the power of leaving campaign spending unlimited.
Now, if you cannot cap spending, you need to find some other
means of reform because the current law does not work. I am for
campaign finance reform. I would like to see stricter disclosure
requirements. I would like to see tight, high criminal penalties for
violation of those disclosure requirements. The disclosure must be
rapid so that the press can inform the electorate about contributions. I agree with my fellow panelist Ed Hayes entirely that disclosure is the remedy for this problem because of the anomalies
under this hybrid situation. But because you cannot cap expenditures—it is equivalent to free speech—you are left with limiting
contributions.148 I also think that if the United States Supreme
Court were to review again the statute that Buckley reviewed, the
contribution limit, $1,000 per person for a candidate for federal office,149 would be overturned.
So the campaign finance reform that I advocate is repeal of the
substantial portion of the present statute. That is, repeal of the
provisions that establish any limitation on contributions or expenditures—which are not successful anyway—and full disclosure.
That would be real reform and would simplify the situation.
What do you say when someone maintains that somebody is
going to give too much money to a candidate and have too much
influence? Well, disclosure takes care of knowing where those interests lay. And if you do not have the limits, you have competing
147. See Kevin Flynn & Ellis Henican, Voter’s Guide ‘89, NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1989,
at 4; Doug Ireland, Clean Out the Vote, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 17, 1998, at 26; Steven L.
Meyers, The 1993 Elections: New York City Roundup; Vallone Says Term Limits Issue Is
Not Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993, at B2.
148. See Michael J. Klapman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 511 (1997).
149. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 608(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998) (providing that “no person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000”).
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interests in our society. We have competition in the marketplace
of ideas. That is what the United States stands for; that is what has
made us great. The First Amendment protects us from those controls, and competition for ideas can take the form of money too.
There are enough good people in our society who would support
valid, bona fide change.
That is my position, and I think it is the best position in light of
the First Amendment of the United States.
MR. BARRET: Thank you. Next is Mark Lopez, an attorney
with the American Civil Liberties Union at the national office in
New York City.
MR. LOPEZ: Good afternoon
The issue of campaign finance reform has been largely dormant since Buckley was decided in 1976. But, in the last two or
three years, reformers have come along and successfully sponsored
a number of state initiatives and legislation that have brought the
issue back into focus.150 I happen to have been in the right place at
the right time and the issue has fallen on my desk; I have become
the point person for the ACLU on the issue.
I am an attorney and I am involved in a number of cases
around the country in which we are challenging this reform.151 In
some of those cases I am direct counsel; in others I am playing a
less prominent role, whether it be an amicus writer or merely a
consultant.
Having said that, let me tell you that the ACLU itself is divided
on this issue.152 There is debate within the organization whether
the dangers or the evils that the proponents of this legislation offer,
justify the restrictions on the First Amendment. Within the organization we are divided.
150. See Hugo Martin, Alarcon-Katz Senate Race a Test for Prop. 208 Politics:
New fund-raising rules and legal challenge to term limits make picking a winner anyone’s guess, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at B1 (stating that limits for candidates for the
state legislature are $250 or $500 for those who agree to spending caps of $300,000 for
primaries and $400,000 for general elections).
151. See Vanatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770 (1997); Brown v. State, 680 So.2d 1179
(1996).
152. See Mary E. Gale & Ramona Ripson, Who’ll Stop the Flood of Campaign Dollars, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles, Cal.), Nov. 4, 1997, at N11.
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It is one of those issues, I think, where a significant percentage
of our constituency disagrees with us, but the national organization
believes that the principled position is that those restrictions are
unconstitutional under prevailing precedent. In addition, we believe that those precedents should be extended to invalidate some
of the more creative reforms that are being proposed out there.
It is not the first time we have had disagreement within the organization.153 You have probably all heard of the Skokie incident.154 If you have not, the Skokie incident involved the Nazi
march through a neighborhood in the suburbs of Chicago where
many Holocaust survivors lived.155 In the short term, that incident
caused our membership to decrease significantly, I believe. But
ultimately, with exposure, our membership increased dramatically,
and I think history has shown that the ACLU was on the correct
side of the issue.156
Proponents of campaign finance reform point out a lot of problems with the current system.157 The ACLU really has no disagreement with a lot of those problems that are being asserted.
That is not an unusual posture for the organization. There are always problems in society—whether it is drugs, whether it is extreme violence, whether it is teen pregnancy—but it is the solutions we often point to when we find ourselves fighting laws
passed in response to those problems. This is another example
where we think the government, in an attempt to come to grips
with what is admittedly a problem, has abandoned any attempt at
precision, which is required by constitutional jurisprudence, and
cast a broad net over the entire problem. This is a very typical
government response to perceived problems out there—and actual

153. See Amy Keller, Shop Talk, ROLL CALL, Mar. 30, 1998.
154. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill.
1978); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
155. See J.R. Reid & Bob Warden, 3,000 Protest Against Nazis in Chicago’s Loop,
WASH. POST, June 25, 1978, at A4.
156. See Richard B. Sapphire, The Constitutional Status of Hate Speech: Comments
on Delgado and Stefanicic, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 499 (1996); see also Nadine Strossen,
Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and
Equality?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 449 (1996).
157. See John Anderson, Colloquai Election Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 205 (1994).
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problems out there.
We would urge the courts and the legislatures to take some effort and work within constitutional frameworks that exist for some
of society’s problems. We believe, as we have heard from some of
the speakers today, that disclosure, accountability, and enforcement of existing corruption laws are all sufficient to redress the
problems.
Take the issue of foreign money coming into the country and
influencing elections. As I understand that, it is illegal.158 So our
suggestion is not to overhaul the whole system of campaign finance, but to enforce those laws that make it a crime for foreign
money to influence federal elections.159
During the last several years, a number of organizations around
the country have successfully placed state initiatives on the ballots
and have dramatically changed the face of money in the election
process in this country.160
The ACLU is monitoring those situations and we are involved
in many of those suits. About twenty states are going down that
road right now.161 They have proposed changes in their laws or
they have enacted changes in their laws that take many different
forms. The most common form is a substantial reduction in the
contribution limits that are out there.
That actually takes me back to Buckley. Buckley upheld a
$1,000 limit.162 For twenty years, most states lived with the
$1,000 limit established by the Federal Election Campaign Act
(“FECA”) and the provisions that were upheld in Buckley. Only
recently have the states pulled those limits down, and this is their
idea of reform.163 So we are talking about limits coming all the

158. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441e (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
159. See id.
160. See Martin, supra note 150; see also Geeta Anand, Mass. Ballot Initiatives
Paying Off for Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1998, at B1.
161. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08 (West 1998) (“[N]o person . . . may . . .
make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate”).
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976).
163. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08 (West 1998) (“[N]o person . . . may . . .
make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate”).
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way down from $1,000 to $50 or $100, sometimes $200.164 Not
surprisingly, candidates and supporters of those candidates have
brought challenges to those laws and, by and large, have prevailed.165
Perhaps two weeks ago you heard about the California limits. I
think they were $250 and $500 for state-wide office.166 I am talking about the state elections. You understand that a state cannot
pass a law that impacts a federal election because of pre-emption
by FECA. So I am talking about state-wide offices, such as state
assemblymen, state senators, and mayors. It could be local elections as well. By and large, those efforts have been rejected by the
courts, and we think we will continue to enjoy some success in that
forum.
Let me take you back to Buckley. It is important to understand
what exactly occurred in Buckley. The Court had before it basically four pieces of legislation: it had contribution limits;167 it had
independent expenditures;168 it had limits on candidate spending,169
and it had the system for financing presidential elections.170 The
Court upheld the $1,000 limit, so contributions by individuals to
candidates could not exceed $1,000.171 That rule extended to contributions by groups, organizations, corporations, and unions as
well.172 It was a $1,000 limit.
The law carved out an exception for political action committees (“PACs”).173 We all know PACs give more than $1,000. So a
164. See Howard Schneider & Hamil R. Harris, District Voters Overruled on Campaign Gift Limits; Council Raises $50, $100 Caps Approved in ‘92, WASH. POST, Apr. 3,
1996, at B1 (discussing campaign gift limits in Washington, D.C.).
165. State of Florida v. Dodd, 561 So.2d 263, 267 (1990) (holding that “the Campaign Financing Act is unconstitutional for its overbroad intrusion upon rights of free
speech and association”).
166. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85301 (West 1997).
167. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-35 (1976).
168. See id. at 39-60.
169. See id. at 39-55.
170. See id. at 85-109.
171. Id. at 35.
172. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 591(g) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
173. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441(a)(2)(A), 608(b)(2) (West 1998); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 n.31 (1976) (noting that certain political committees can donate up
to $5,000 per candidate).
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union PAC or a corporate PAC—and corporations and unions
typically have many, many PACs—was allowed to give up to
$5,000 to a candidate.174
And then, of course, there was an aggregate limit on the
amount of money you could contribute to all candidates and PACs,
and I believe that was $25,000.175
Now, the Court said you could not limit a candidate’s own
spending.176 So if a rich candidate came along, that candidate of
course was free to spend his or her own money as well as all the
money lawfully raised. That is still the law, as demonstrated by
the Huffington and Perot examples.177
The Court struck down the limits on non-coordinated independent expenditures.178 That is a mouthful, non-coordinated independent expenditures. What are non-coordinated independent
expenditures?
Let me first tell you what coordinated expenditures are. A coordinated expenditure is when a contributor talks with a candidate
or the candidate’s committee and then goes out and takes an advertisement that urges the candidate’s election or defeat.179 That is a
coordinated expenditure. The Supreme Court said that they were
going to treat that as a contribution.180 I think that makes sense to
most people.
But non-coordinated independent expenditures are those expenditures where the contributor does not talk to the candidate and
takes out an advertisement or prints 1,000 leaflets.181 The Supreme
Court said supporters have an unequivocal constitutional right to

174. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(a)(2).
175. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(2)(C); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38
(1976).
176. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 59 n.67 (noting that such limits violate the First, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments).
177. See Bob Hohler, Election Finance Targeted in Equality Fight, Big Money Seen
as Insidious Force, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1997, at A1; see Lauder, supra note 125.
178. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54; see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
179. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-36, 46-48.
180. Id.
181. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. 604.
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do that.182 The Supreme Court has since affirmed that basic principle in many subsequent decisions, including a decision in Colorado as recently as two years ago.183
So there is really no reason to believe that the Supreme Court is
going to retreat from these two basic rules. If anything, as Mr.
Kayser pointed out, they are going to revisit the limit on contributions because it is just dated—the $1,000, if anything, should be
adjusted upwards to $3,000 to take into effect inflation—and it
really has not worked. Some of the premises that the law is posited
on are really not there anymore. Plus, the Court has moved in a
different direction, I think, from where it was in 1976.184
Because the Court at that time split the pie, so to speak, between upholding limits on campaign contributions and striking
down the limits on independent expenditures, guess what? FECA
cannot work. It cannot work with that dichotomy, because all the
money that was going into the candidates’ coffers is now being diverted to independent expenditures. Therefore, nothing has been
accomplished. Maybe the Court knew that when it split the pie.
But that is what has gone on.
Well, understandably, people are frustrated with that, and that
is why there have been all those reform efforts. But the answer is
not to reduce the contribution limits from $1,000 down to $100.
The answer, if anything, it seems to me, is to address the problem
of independent expenditures, because there is no accountability
with independent expenditures, except that they must be reported.
Like I said, the Court is not going to revisit that issue on independent expenditures. We have to live with that. I think that is
correct. I think the Court is correct. That is speech at its best. I—
or you—should be able to go out there and take out an advertisement in a newspaper and spend as much money as I want supporting a candidate, as long as it is not a direct contribution to that
candidate.
182. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
183. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. 604; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
184. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381
(1992).
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The third part of Buckley, which is a significant predicate for
the discussion, regards the public financing of elections.185 Now,
forget contributions and forget independent expenditures. Public
financing of elections is when you accept government funds in exchange for an agreement to forgo reliance on private funding.186
That is what we have at the federal level for presidential elections.
Buckley upheld that system, as long as the decision to participate
was voluntary and not coerced.187
There is not a similar system in place for the House of Representatives or Senate. Understand that. Congress right now is
struggling with whether or not to change the content of the presidential public financing system that is in place and they are also
struggling with whether or not to extend that system to the House
and Senate races.188 I think, however, that the prospects of that
legislation going anywhere are really very slim.
We at the ACLU are concerned with the states that have rushed
to fashion their own public financing alternatives.189 The problem
is that the states have not patterned those programs after the federal
system. They have, by and large, substantially deviated from those
programs. We believe that those states—Maine,190 Massachusetts,191 Hawaii,192 Kentucky,193 and Minnesota,194 just off the top
of my mind—have designed programs that are calculated to force
you into the public financing alternative and to remove any intelligent choice from the process. In other words, they establish a sys-

185. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85, 293-329.
186. See Don’t Expand Public Financing of Elections, USA Today, Apr. 4, 1997, at
A13; Doug Ireland, Clean Out the Vote, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 17, 1998, at 26; John E.
Yang & Helen Dewar, Gingrich Would End Caps On Election Contributions; In Surprise
Move, Senate to Begin Debate Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1997, at A14.
187. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-86.
188. See H.R. 794, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 229, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 57, 105th
Cong. (1997); S. 243, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Yang & Dewar, supra note 186.
189. See Grant Moos, States Look to Public Campaign Financing to Clean Up Election System, WEST’S LEGAL NEWS, July 29, 1996, at 7698, available in West,
WESTLAW, 1996 WL 419511.
190. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1121 (West 1997).
191. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 55A, § 6 (West 1998).
192. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-226 (1997).
193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121A (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
194. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211A (West 1997).
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tem of inducements for participation and penalties for nonparticipation.
I will just summarize the system we are challenging in Maine.
This will give you an idea of how much some of those states are
willing to push the envelope. Not all states, however, have pushed
the envelope. For example, the New York system described by my
colleague is really very modest, and I do not think anyone has
challenged the New York system.195 I do not think the ACLU has
any problem with the New York system.
But some of the states have really pushed the envelope. Maine
is a case I am involved in.196 Here are the basic parameters: If a
candidate qualifies for public financing in a Maine state election,
which is a big if, the candidate can get a lot of money up-front.197
Basically right up-front, on the day the candidate qualifies, the
candidate will be paid the equivalent of the amount that was spent
in the last election.198 So the candidate receives a big chunk of
money up-front.
The candidate will also be certified by the State of Maine as a
“Maine Clean Election Candidate.”199 There is a question right
now whether or not that certification is going to appear on the ballot to alert voters.200 Those are significant inducements.
In addition to that, if a candidate’s non-participating opponent
nevertheless is able to raise a greater amount of money than the
spending limits the candidate agreed to in exchange for the receipt
of those public funds, Maine will waive those spending limits and
pay the candidate the amount of the excess.201
195. The federal system, however, has been challenged. See Albanese v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 884 F. Supp. 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing challenge to the congressional election finance system for lack of standing).
196. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1121 (West 1997).
197. See id. § 1125; see also Jack Beaudoin, Tax Forum Includes Campaign Fund
Box, Main Legislative Candidates Would Be Able to Use the Public Funds, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Feb. 2, 1998, at B1.
198. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1125(8)-(9). The actual amount of funding reflects a one-time 25% reduction in the average of amounts spent in the 1996 and
1998 elections. See id. § 1125(8)(D).
199. See id. § 1125(5).
200. See id.
201. See id. § 1125(9).
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To make matters worse, Maine will calculate independent expenditures by third parties—by a person who may not even know
the outside candidates—and will take the value of those independent expenditures and provide a matching fund to the candidate who
agrees to public financing.202 Independent expenditures benefiting
the clean candidate, however, do not count toward that candidate’s
spending limit.
Under those circumstances, we think that a candidate has no
choice but to participate in the public financing alternative, and
that is pretty much the heart of the case. I think we will prevail—I
hope we will prevail—because we believe that the public financing
choice should be voluntary and we believe that this system corrupts or destroys the voluntariness in that program.
I would just add that there are many variations on this program.
Maine is not the most pernicious example out there. Under the
system in Kentucky,203 once the outside candidate’s spending
waives the spending limits, that is, exceeds the amount of money
that was allocated to the “clean” candidate, the clean candidate receives matching funds from the state at a two-to-one rate.204 So all
of a sudden, the inside candidate, who was even with the outside
candidate, receives a two-to-one match for every excess dollar the
outside candidate raises. We think a program that is designed like
that is not voluntary.
In Rhode Island, clean candidates can raise contributions in
$2,000 increments, while outside candidates can only raise it in
$1,000 increments.205 In Minnesota206 and Hawaii,207 donors to
clean candidates may take a tax deduction; donors to outside candidates cannot take a tax deduction.208 Under those circumstances
we think that the supporter of the outside candidate is being directly penalized; it is a direct tax on that person’s speech.

202. See id. §§ 1019, 1125(9).
203. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121A (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
204. See id. §§ 121A.030, 121A.060, 121A.080.
205. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-19 (1998).
206. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211A (West 1997).
207. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-226 (1997).
208. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 55A, § 6; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211A; HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 11-226, 11-235-7(g)(2).
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Those are some of the programs that are out there. Some are
more benign than others. I think the ones that push the envelope
are going to fall. I think the ones that come closer to resembling
New York’s are going to be upheld. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court is going to have to decide the issue and revisit Buckley.
MR. BARRETT: We are going to open up to some questions. I
just want to start with one. Several of the speakers relied on me
essentially. Those who were opposed to expenditure caps relied on
the media and disclosure as a key element in dealing with the problems of quid pro quos and the problems of the campaign finance
system.
Well, I tried to address that in my brief remarks at the start,
which is that basically the quid pro quo story is a withering story.
It is dying on the pages of newspapers. Television certainly will
not cover it to any substantial degree; they would not even cover a
senatorial investigation of it. Media managers believe the public is
not interested in those stories. I have to fight to get them into the
pages of the Village Voice.209 And certainly, Rupert Murdoch and
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, who have their own dealings with the
governments, have not and are not going to give great play to campaign finance abuses.
So in regard to disclosure, I find it ironic that Mr. Kayser, who
was on the Pataki Campaign Committee, supports disclosure because the Pataki Campaign Committee files their disclosure forms
alphabetically by first name,210 so it is impossible for reporters to
discern. Because the disclosures are filed alphabetically by first
name, the campaign finance documents must be re-collated and reorganized. And Mr. Kayser believes disclosure is the answer.
I think the question that Mr. Kayser posed is a hard question
for everyone on the panel, and I would like to have each member
of the panel try to address it. He asked, does anyone think government can restrict the number of advertisements you can buy or
the amount of literature you can print?
209. Mr. Barrett is published regularly in the Village Voice.
210. See Wayne Barrett, Papering Over Giuliani & Pataki, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 6,
1998, at 49.
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I just want to say one other thing about the Ron Lauder campaign. I covered the Ron Lauder campaign. Mr. Kayser is confusing two facts. Mr. Lauder has always been a tremendous champion of term limits. He has spent millions of dollars promoting
term limits. He did not spend one of the $13 million he spent on
his campaign to promote term limits.211 All of that money was
spent on the most negative campaign we have ever seen in New
York City, directed at mayoral candidate Rudolph Giuliani, because Mr. Lauder was then an agent of Alfonse D’Amato.212 He
was not really running for mayor. He never did a positive commercial about himself. He spent $13 million in 1989 attacking Rudolph Giuliani, now the incumbent mayor, for not supporting term
limits.213 Mr. Kayser is confusing that with other television campaigns that Mr. Lauder did conduct supporting term limits.214
But I think each member of the panel might want to address
Mr. Kayser’s question, and certainly Mr. Kayser should get a
chance to rebut some of my statements. Does anyone think government can restrict the number of advertisements you can buy or
the amount of literature you can print? Would anybody want to
address that?
MR. JOERSS: Yes. No, I do not think government can directly
limit the amount of advertisements you can buy. What government can do is set up voluntary systems similar to the Maine system, which I do not think goes too far. Government can also try to
talk the media into giving free and discounted air time. The broadcast rights and the airways used by the media are public property.215 The rights to the airways are leased by the broadcasters.216
211. See Howard Kurtz, The Sound Bites & the Fury for N.Y.’s Mayoralty; Koch
and Challengers Rev It Up for Tomorrow’s Primary, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1989, at D1.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Wayne Barrett, Rudy Probed Al: The Agent Branded a Spy Investigated
D’Amato, VILLAGE VOICE, July 11, 1995, at 12 (reporting that Ron Lauder initiated a
separate campaign on the term limits issue).
215. See Thomas F. Ackley, Note, Political Candidates’ First Amendment Rights
Can Be Trumped By Journalists’ Editorial Rights: Candidates Barred From Public
Television Debate in Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 475, 48485 (1998); Camille Kimball, Political Candidate Need to Speak Freely, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Mar. 28, 1998, at D7; Newton N. Minow, Freeing the Public Airwaves From All Forms
of “Free Air Time”, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 1998, at 23.
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In that lease, Congress reserves the right to use those broadcast
airways for the public good.217 So there is legal ground for using
the airways for debates or candidate advertisements. This is a way
that candidates can get their messages out without having to rely
on raising millions of dollars.
MR. BARRETT: Anybody else? Mr. Kastin, I think this goes
directly to the system that you are operating.
MR. KASTIN: Right. I think one point to keep in mind is the
limits that we are talking about. For example, the spending limit
for the recent mayoral election—the general election, not the primary—was $4.7 million. I think that is a very reasonable number
to set for a mayoral campaign that lasts from September to November. Technically, any spending limit can be interpreted as limiting in effect the number of pamphlets ultimately printed, but is it
really affecting the quality of the campaign? Do New Yorkers
honestly believe that the number of issues that were raised during
the campaign and the level of political debate were hindered by the
spending limit? I think that because the spending limits are set
high enough to allow for a reasonable campaign, there is no danger.
MR. BARRETT: Mr. Kayser, anyone else?
MR. KAYSER: I suppose, as a point of personal privilege, I
would like to respond to a couple of remarks made by Wayne Barrett.
One, I did not cover the Lauder campaign as a journalist, the
way Wayne did, but I disagree with his characterization of Ron
Lauder’s campaigning efforts. In an election, you vote for the
candidate whose propositions you agree with. Wayne acknowledges that Ron Lauder was a significant supporter of term limits.
So when Ron Lauder injects himself into a campaign and spends
his money and raises his profile—and there were a lot of organizations that supported him—there was Change New York and other
groups involved in fund-raising efforts for financing term limits. It
may be that Wayne elected not to cover those aspects or did not re-

216. See Ackley, supra note 215, at 484-85; Minow, supra note 215, at 23.
217. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 396, 548, 554 (West 1998).
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alize that there was also an agenda relating to term limits. But
there was, in terms of organizations and developing infrastructure
and things that led to the successful campaign later.
You have to lay the groundwork for change in campaigns. I
think, for example, Steve Forbes is doing the same thing with respect to his profile and persona with the issues that he has taken in
terms of tax reform in the United States, which will probably be
very fruitful a few years from now. But you cannot do it overnight. There is an educational process associated with it.
As to the fact that the Pataki campaign donors are listed alphabetically by first name. I am aware of this situation, and my
awareness of that is why I say there is room for reform. That leads
back to the disclosure laws. There can be much more effective
disclosure. You can require by statute how things are to be done—
the timeliness, how things are to be posted, how it is going to be
organized. All of that can be legislated.
I am advocating those changes for disclosure. I believe the
disclosure should be effective and should not be used as a subterfuge, it should not be done at the last minute, and it should be done
in an easy way for journalists to have access. We do need change
in that area. So I do not disagree with Wayne at all in that regard.
MR. LOPEZ: I would like to return to the question on the distribution of literature. There are two ways to look at this. If you
are talking about placing limits on candidates in exchange for the
receipt of public financing, I think that is one constitutional question. I think it is quite another, however, if you are talking about
imposing limits on my right or your right as a non-candidate to
spend your money on the distribution of literature. I would hope
that no one here is suggesting that under any circumstance that is
an appropriate remedy for what many people see as an evil independent expense.
MR. BARRETT: All right. How about some questions from
the audience? Anybody have any questions?
QUESTION: A question I know previous speakers have
touched on but I would like to hear more about is enforcement. I
have filled out the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) reports
and they lack a lot of basic information. The FEC is also very lax
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on enforcement. I also believe that currently the FEC only has
about a handful of investigators, which hampers any investigation.
For example, presidential campaigns from 1988 have just paid
their FEC fines in the last few years.218 Do you think that a
stepped-up enforcement or the creation of a more non-partisan and
more powerful FEC would help resolve some of the problems we
have? I would also like to hear Mr. Kastin’s comments on how
New York City handles those kind of problems.
MR. KASTIN: One important difference between New York
City’s program and the FEC is that the City’s program conducts
enforcement during the election cycle. So, for example, in 1997
the Giuliani campaign was fined prior to the election.219 Because
the FEC conducts investigations after the elections, candidates may
be less concerned about violating campaign finance regulations.
That element alone does lend some bite to New York City’s program because candidates are aware that they may face a fine prior
to the election if they fail to follow the requirements.
Another difference between the two is that the members of the
Campaign Finance Board are non-partisan and the FEC is appointed equally between Democrats and Republicans.220 That factor also lends an element of gridlock in the FEC because you naturally are going to have certain members aligned with one
candidate.
MR. BARRETT: Let’s just say that the FEC does not have Father O’Hare,221 who, speaking of the First Amendment rights, may
218. See Benjamin Weiser & Bill McAllister, The Little Agency That Can’t; Election-Law Enforcer is Weak by Design, Paralyzed by Division, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
1997, at A1; What About FEC? A Simple Route to Cleaner Campaigns, MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL STAR TRIB., Oct. 17, 1997, at A26.
219. In 1997, the New York City Campaign Finance Board fined Mayor Giuliani’s
re-election campaign $243,490 for exceeding contribution limits. See Clifford J. Levy,
Giuliani Campaign Is Fined $220,000 Over Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at
A1; Jonathan P. Hicks, Chairman of City Campaign Finance Board Calls For Sharp
Changes in Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at B8, C2 (reporting that the Campaign
Finance Board temporarily cut off public funds to the Giuliani campaign after finding
that hundreds of thousands of dollars in contributions to Giuliani had violated the rules).
220. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998) (“No more than 3
members [of the 6 appointed by the President] . . . may be affiliated with the same political party.”); NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1).
221. Father Joseph O’Hare is chairman of the New York City Campaign Finance
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not be re-appointed based on some of the things he just did.222
MR. GARNER: I am Robert Garner, managing editor of the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, and I have a broader question on First Amendment rights for
Mr. Lopez. You mentioned that there might be a problem with
conditioning the number of campaign advertisements and pamphlets and such on the receipt of public funds. I want to ask you if
that would fall under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions?
MR. LOPEZ: Right. We do not believe that the government
should be able to condition the receipt of government benefits on
the waiver of a constitutional right. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine grew out of cases in which the Supreme Court said
that you could not do that.223
Unfortunately, there has been a retreat from those cases, most
recently in the arts funding context and also in the hospital funding
context. According to the recent cases, for example, if you want to
receive government funds, you cannot conduct abortions;224 if you
want to get government grants to create art, you cannot do art
Board and the President of Fordham University.
222. See William Murphy, Missing Out on Budget Process, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3,
1998, at A36.
223. The state cannot attach unconstitutional conditions to the receipt of government benefits. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that the state
cannot revoke or withhold a benefit as a penalty for exercising a constitutional right); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that the state cannot deny a benefit, including a contract or other privilege, simply because the intended recipient refuses to relinquish a constitutional right); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (same); Frost v.
Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (refusing to allow California to impose unconstitutional conditions on the use of its highways). Frost set forth one of the earliest, bestknown, and most forceful statements of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. . . . It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States
may thus be manipulated out of existence.
Id. at 593.
224. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (ruling that a
state need not commit any resources to performing abortions because nothing in the Constitution requires states to enter or remain in the abortion business or entitles private physicians
and their patients to access to public facilities for the performance of abortions).
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which is pornographic art.225
MR. GARNER: If I may follow up, didn’t the Court make a
distinction between unconstitutional conditions and the purchase of
government services, as in case regarding federal funding for family planning clinics?226
MR. LOPEZ: Yes, but it is one of those distinctions that we
really think is not a distinction,227 and I guess that is where we
would part company with the Court.
MR. BARRETT: Anyone else?
MR. KAYSER: If I could comment on that question for a minute. One of the general problems that we have in our society today
is that we do not live long enough, so our collective memories
from generation to generation are pretty short. There are not many
of us who have a recollection of the way the United States was in
the 1920s, for example, or the 1930s, before the New Deal.
225. See, e.g., Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976) (ruling
that governor and Executive Council of New Hampshire did not stifle free expression by
reversing art grant awarded to literary magazine due to the magazine’s publication of a
purportedly offensive poem). But see Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F.
Supp. 1457, 1475-76 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (striking down the National Endowment for the
Arts’ (“NEA”) “decency” clause for artistic grants), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 118 S. Ct. 554l (1997); Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (finding NEA’s certification requirement unconstitutional).
226. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-97 (1991) (allowing the government to
prevent the use of federal funds to disseminate abortion-related advice at federallyfunded family planning clinics). As the Court explained in Rust, “when the government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program.” Id. at 194.
227. Rust stands for the proposition that the government may make content-based
choices when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message. The Court cautioned, however, that its holding in Rust would not apply to public
fora or to universities, which occupied “a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government
funds is restricted.” Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. That distinction was tested in Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, in which the Court ruled that a public university could not deny funding to a student publication based on its religious content: as long
as the publication did not speak for the university. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). In both Rosenberger and Rust, the Court attempted to draw a fine line between conditions imposed on government-funded private speech and conditions imposed on the government’s own speech or
that of its surrogates.
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During this century, the government’s involvement in all sorts
of different areas of people’s lives has continued to increase. So
we face problems with conditioning some government benefit
upon the release of some right.228 For example, in exchange for
public housing, one might be forced to waive his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. This type of
exchange is endemic in our society.
The best way of dealing with it, in my opinion, is to move toward mechanisms which do not depend upon government financing and which have more empowerment and protections for the individual. In this way, you might avoid raising those issues in the
beginning. So, for example, you can privatize public housing, you
sell it off, and you distribute it, basically co-op it, and give people
the right to own what they are living in. You put capital into the
hands of individuals and then you could add greater property protections for individuals in our society.
We need a smaller, less intrusive government, with less dependency upon government. That will protect us with respect to
our constitutional rights and those unreasonable conditions requiring a person to waive constitutional rights.
228. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (ruling that a state college
could not refuse to renew a non-tenured professor’s contract in retaliation for his public
criticism of the school administration). In Perry, the Court held that a state cannot condition a benefit on a restriction of protected First Amendment activity even where the benefit is discretionary, rather than an entitlement:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no “right” to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. . . . Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
Id. at 587 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In
Speiser, the Court ruled that California could not deny a tax exemption to applicants who
refused to sign a loyalty oath. The Court rejected the idea that because the tax exemption
was a discretionary “privilege” or “bounty,” the limitation placed on the “privilege”
could not be a First Amendment violation:
[A] discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. . . . To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent
effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518.
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MR. BARRETT: Who is next?
QUESTION: This is a question for anyone who wants to address it. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision two years ago in
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission,229 where they said that political parties can
basically spend limitless amounts of money on behalf of political
candidates. Besides contribution limits of $1,000 per individual or
$5,000 per PAC, what is really left to the campaign finance laws
when any group or any individual can basically run a campaign for
a candidate?
MR. LOPEZ: Let me clarify something you said about that
case that is a mistake. The Court said that political party spending
does not violate the contribution limits set down by FECA as long
as the political party’s spending is not coordinated with the candidate.230 In other words, the political party has the right to go out
and expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate. The FECA folks said, by definition, political party is the alter-ego of the candidate.231 The Supreme Court did not accept
it.232 The Court said, as long as it is not coordinated, they are independent creatures.233
QUESTION: Just to look at that again. What is to stop the Republican Party from running Bob Dole’s campaign for him?
MR. KAYSER: I can answer that. First, the question you are
raising is actually the focal point of the investigation and the decision by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno not to appoint a special
prosecutor for President Clinton.234 President Clinton raised
money and directly oversaw the Democratic National Committee’s
running of his advertisements during his campaign.235 There was
clear coordination in fund-raising and everything, all under one en-

229. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
230. See id. at 608, 613.
231. See id. at 613.
232. Id. at 613-14.
233. Id. at 614-16.
234. See Ronald J. Ostrow & Jonathan Peterson, Reno Won’t Seek Special Counsel
on White House Calls Politics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A1.
235. See Lena H. Sun, Huang Accused of Seeking to Mask DNS Funds, CHI. SUNTIMES, Feb. 20, 1997, at 16.
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tity.
But Janet Reno basically has made the decision, as attorney
general of the United States, that we no longer have any restrictions to speak of that are meaningful under the current statutory
system. That is the de facto decision of the attorney general of the
United States.
In some ways I agree with her. I think the best thing is just to
junk it, move away from it, have full disclosure, effective disclosure, and accept Janet Reno’s decision. I think that basically that is
what the American public has decided too. That is why we do not
have the people up in arms over what is going on here. The
American people do not want the restrictions on either the contributions or expenditures.
I think that is the minority position. It has the support and it is
resonated in journals like the New York Times and in certain other
journals, who already have a forum and would like to restrict people who do not control the media but who need a outlet, because
that enhances the media on a relevant basis. As my fellow panelist
Ed Hayes mentioned earlier, it is a question of whose ox is gored:
who is trying to advocate something to the detriment of somebody
else.
But the First Amendment is there, fortunately, and we have a
Supreme Court that is going to stand behind it. The sooner that we
call it the way it is, move ahead, and get over this—we are wasting
an awful lot of time over a debate that is going nowhere in terms of
change in the direction of more restrictions. What we ought to
move toward is more liberty, more freedom, more competition, and
full disclosure. I think that is what most people want. I think if
there were a vote held today, that is the way it would be in the
United States.
But the majority decision is not the way it is going to be determined. It is going to be determined by the law—the United States
Constitution.
MR. BARRETT: We are running out of time. We have time
for one more question.
MR. JOERSS: One quick point. I think the idea of removing
all spending and contribution limits and increasing disclosure and
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calling it reform is somewhat preposterous. To remove all of the
laws would create a legalized system of bribery: based on which
candidates are receiving the money. There are enough ways that
the party can run that money around, even with strong disclosure
laws, that we are not going to get good answers about this. The
fundamental problem remains: Huge amounts of capital coming in
from individuals, which is subverting the democratic process.
MR. BARRETT: Mr. Joerss, didn’t you indicate in your presentation that the poll showed substantial support for it?
MR. JOERSS: In the CBS News/New York Times poll, nine out
of ten Americans supported radical reform of the campaign finance
structure and say it is broken.236
MR. BARRETT: Do the polls indicate whether or not they favor restrictions on contributions or expenditures, or just that they
want to see some radical change?
MR. JOERSS: They said the system is broken and needs fixing. Whether they specifically want to scrap all existing laws except disclosure, I do not know, but I would not think so.
MR. KASTIN: In New York City, the media and public often
place heavy pressure on politicians to join the program.237 As a result, the numbers for joining are very high. As far as New York
City goes—this may be different than the rest of the country—it is
clear that the media and the public do want politicians to abide by
limits.
MR. BARRETT: Last question.
QUESTION: Mr. Kayser, wouldn’t the net effect of the system
that you are proposing, in which there were no restrictions at all,
lead to having the exact opposite effect of what you are saying?

236. See Lewis supra note 63, at F32.
237. See ROAD TO REFORM, supra note 121, at 10. The Campaign Finance Board
reported that candidates responded to media pressure to join the program:
One reason participation has increased from election to election may be the
increasing attention the Program has received from the media. Considerable
dissatisfaction has been expressed by editorial boards at “politics as usual”
campaigns, and participation in the Program is regarded as an important criterion by which to judge whether a campaign has rejected these practices.

Id.
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Would there be, in fact, a new exclusivity of access to media and
to campaigning—restricted to those who could afford to buy it, or
is that just the way it is and that’s unfair?
MR. KAYSER: I do not know. But when you talk about exclusivity, you are assuming that there is a monolithic aspect to
wealth and that people who have money all agree with one position. I assume that that is the corollary of what you are saying.
My experience is that we have a fairly wide distribution of
wealth in the United States and in the world, but particularly in the
United States, and that there is a lot of diversity. I do not find that
people who have wealth necessarily agree on issues. In fact, I find
that people who have wealth are intellectually pretty acute with respect to issues and there is a lot of disagreement. Therefore, the
idea that people with money in the private sector or the personal
sector are going to speak with one voice is just wrong.
Also, I think that there are diverse opinions embodied in different sources, whether it be in television or in newspapers. We have
plenty of diversity in the United States. To suggest that you need
to put caps on people’s access with money in order to avoid exclusivity or a monopoly on ideas is ludicrous, just ludicrous. It cannot
be supported by any objective analysis.
Why try to regulate something that does not need to be regulated and under our Constitution cannot effectively be regulated?
It has been shown that way. Why try to? The United States is not
broken. To the extent that we have tried to do some things under
our statutory system, which clearly does not work, that is broken.
And if you want to talk about the public wanting radical reform,
yes, I am a reformist, I would be in the majority of the poll taken.
If the right questions were asked, I would suggest that the position that I am articulating is the majority position. But I am saying
that is really not the issue; the issue is the analytically correct position under our Constitution, and that is what should govern the
day.
MR. BARRETT: I want to thank everybody for coming and for
participating in this symposium discussion. Thank you.

